Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Objects of belief, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. When several speakers refer on their intensional object there is the problem of whether it is the same or not. E.g., Do they have the same wish?
See also relation-theory, truthmakers, mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jaakko Hintikka on Objects of Belief - Dictionary of Arguments
II 45 (A) Objects of Knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge". Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose Frege's approach with the semantics of possible worlds (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds). II 46 Idea: the application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global. >Possible worlds. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b is a scenario. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge. Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate. Objects of Knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge. Identity/substitutability/substitutability in identity/terminology/Frege/Hintikka: substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts). >Opacity. II 47 (...) E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguishes two types of context: Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent. Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not words used by Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture: (4) Expression > Meaning > Reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified: (5) expression (>) meaning (> reference). II 49 (B) Objects of Knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world. New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds. Morning Star/evening star/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Possible world semantics._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Hintikka
> Counter arguments in relation to Objects of Belief
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28